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ADDENDUM TO NATIONAL POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS  
IN POST-HOSTAGE IRAN--US POLICY OPTIONS: Some Alternatives

I. IGNORE IRAN, US DEFENSE LINE BASED ON SAUDIS

- +Low profile reduces risk of more anti-US incidents
- +No US commitment avoids danger of clashing with Soviets
- Leaves Iran open to Soviets
- Weakens moderates in Iran

II. BACK BANI-SADR OPENLY, OFFER IRAN US AID

- +Warns Soviets
- Probably weaken Bani-Sadr and give his enemies ammunition
- Bani-Sadr does not want US aid
- Increased risk of another hostage-type incident
- Stronger Iran may threaten Saudis

III. TAKE LOW PROFILE, WAIT FOR IRANIANS TO COME TO US

- +Low risk of another incident
- +Allows moderates to maneuver on their own
- +Gives Soviets little justification for intervention
- Provides little backing to moderates, leaves field open for radicals

IV. ALLOW AND ENCOURAGE NATO ALLIES TO TAKE GREATER ROLE IN  
IRAN--ESPECIALLY ARMS SALES

- +Little risk on new incident
- Any increase in Iranian strength may endanger Saudis if Iran exports revolution

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